Journals
Volume 34, No. 3, Summer 2004
The Continuing Debate over Tort Duty in New Mexico: The Role of Foreseeability and Policy in Herrera v. Quality Pontiac
Quinn Bumgarner-Kirby
In Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a car dealership owed a tort duty to victims who were injured in an accident caused by a driver who had stolen the car from the dealership. This note begins by contextualizing Herrera through an examination of two of the foundational New Mexico cases on negligence duty, and then describes how Herrera examined the same two factors explored in those cases: foreseeability of injury to the particular plaintiff and the question of whether New Mexico policy supports the imposition of a duty. This note argues that while Herrera used the same framework as past cases, it changed the method of analysis to be used within that framework by relaxing the policy standard necessary for a finding of duty, and by shifting the balance of power with respect to foreseeability away from juries and back to the courts. Finally, the note suggests how Herrera may be used to further expand duty in future third-party tortfeasor cases, and examines whether New Mexico should eliminate foreseeability from the tort duty analysis.
New Tort Rules for Unmarried Partners: The Potential for Successful Loss of Consortium and NIED Claims by Same-Sex Partners in New Mexico after Lozoya v. Sanchez
Flynn Sylvest
In March 2003, the New Mexico Supreme Court produced a new consortium rule that paves the way for consortium claims by same-sex partners in New Mexico. The ruling also indicated a likely change to the relationship requirement of the New Mexico negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) rule that would increase the possibility that same-sex partners could succeed with NIED claims. Lozoya showed the court’s continued interest in containing the loss of consortium claim, but with an emphasis on relationships as they actually exist rather than legal status. New Mexico’s consortium law has reflected the court’s ongoing interest in responding to cultural realities, both that reflect traditional patterns unique to the state, as well as modernizing developments in concepts of intimate familial relationships. Combined with a trend in New Mexico law favoring greater protections for same sex-couples, Lozoya creates a clear path to legal recognition of same-sex partnership tort actions.
State ex rel. New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission v. Espinosa: Can Judicial Integrity Survive Executive Control?
Kimberly Bannerman
In a politically charged atmosphere, a split New Mexico Supreme Court held, in State ex rel. Judicial Standards Commission v. Espinosa, that the governor has the constitutional authority to remove, without cause and at any time, the lay members of the Judicial Standards Commission. First, the court held that the removal did not violate fundamental separation of powers principles. Second, the court held that article VI, section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution, the provision that created that Judicial Standards Commission, does not limit the executive removal power over appointees found in article V, section 5 of the constitution. The court also had to deal with the issue of whether or not the staggered-term system the commissioners were a part of limited the executive removal power. Using its previous holding in Denish v. Johnson, the court held that staggered-terms alone could not limit the express removal power granted under article V. This note examines how the court’s overly formalistic holding threatens traditional separation of powers notions and jeopardizes the balance of powers between the branches of government in New Mexico.
State v. Urioste: A Prosecutor’s Dream and Defender’s Nightmare
Amanda C. Sanchez
In State v. Urioste, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that information provided by an anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to constitute reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. The Urioste decision serves as a prime example for illustrating the problems with the New Mexico standard for determining reasonable suspicion based upon an anonymous tip. Specifically, the New Mexico courts apply the totality of the circumstances approach to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists rather than the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test.
In State v. Cordova, the New Mexico Supreme Court retained the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which requires a showing of the informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity, for evaluating whether information from an informant establishes probable cause. However, when evaluating whether an anonymous tip establishes reasonable suspicion, the Urioste court ignored its own reasoning set forth in Cordova by applying the totality of the circumstances approach. This casenote argues that the New Mexico courts should adopt the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test when evaluating whether an anonymous tip establishes reasonable suspicion.
Adding Charges on Retrial: Double Jeopardy, Interstitialism, and State v. Lynch
Cara Mickelsen
The double jeopardy clauses of the New Mexico and United States Constitutions have been applied to a broad range of situations, resulting in an enormous body of law and a good deal of confusion. State v. Lynch confronts an issue not previously addressed in New Mexico and only rarely addressed elsewhere: whether double jeopardy bars the addition of charges on retrial after the defendant wins a new trial on appeal. This note examines the federal law the Lynch court considered and relevant federal law it did not, as well as the final result based on New Mexico law. Lynch represents a victory for criminal defendants and for principles of fairness, as well as for the development of independent state law, but did not clarify federal law as it might have. Beyond that, Lynch creates possibilities for future state double jeopardy litigation and, in its treatment of interstitialism, may suggest a solution to the problem created when federal constitutional issues are not clear but there is a strong argument for a finding of state constitutional protection.
Complying with Nunez: The Necessary Procedure for Obtaining Forfeiture of Property and Avoiding Double Jeopardy After State v. Esparza
Michelle Haubert-Barela
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in State v. Nunez, required that civil forfeiture and criminal prosecutions be pursued in a single, bifurcated proceeding in order to avoid double jeopardy implications. This ruling provided defendants, subject to both civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution, substantially more protection under the New Mexico double jeopardy clause than federal law would typically provide. Yet, the court’s decision also created a great deal of procedural uncertainty. State v. Esparza marks the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ first attempt at dealing with the procedure mandated in Nunez head-on. This note examines the Esparza decision, its adherence to Nunez, and the role that the policies underlying double jeopardy played in shaping New Mexico law. While the protection Nunez extended to defendants remains intact, this note suggests that the next logical step for the New Mexico courts and legislature is to create and use criminal forfeiture.
