Journals
Volume 37, No. 3, Summer 2007
The Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Programs: A Real World Analysis Based in New Mexico
Maya Anderson
Recidivism is a huge problem in the U.S. penal system. One suggested solution is to allow inmates to participate in faith-based prison programming. Faith-based prison programming uses religiously centered classes and activities in an attempt to rehabilitate prisoners and, ultimately, reduce the likelihood that they will return to jail. The use of government funds and resources to support these programs, however, poses potential Establishment Clause problems. Using the fact pattern of a recent New Mexico case, this Article applies the current Establishment Clause jurisprudence from the U.S. Supreme Court and various lower courts to assess the constitutionality of such programs. In the end, the constitutionality of faith-based prison programs depends on which of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause analyses is applied. The recent ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. is also reviewed. The Hein decision may reduce the number of Establishment Clause challenges brought against faith-based prison programs as it severely limits the ability of taxpayers to bring such claims. This Article ultimately concludes that if faith-based programming is going to be used in prisons to try to reduce recidivism, it must be implemented in a manner that does not cross the constitutional barrier intended to separate church and state.
New Mexico as Hollywood’s Backlot: An Examination of Film Financing, State Tax Incentives, and Constitutional Limitations
Danielle Cantrell
While Hollywood, California may be the center of the global entertainment industry, it is certainly not the only place on Earth where movies and television shows are produced. In recent decades, globalization, rising domestic production costs, and lower wages and exchange rates have forced more productions abroad. This phenomenon of “runaway production” has grown to an alarming problem of national proportion, costing the American economy both billions of dollars and thousands of jobs. A local solution to the national problem of runaway production is state tax incentives for economic development. New Mexico’s Film Incentive Program, established in 2002, is one of the nation’s most extensive and aggressive. The program’s varied offerings of loans, rebates, and other tax-free initiatives are stimulating economic growth and helping stem the tide of runaway production.
As promising as New Mexico’s solution sounds, it is not immune from attack. State tax incentives in other industries have been challenged under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution for discriminating against interstate commerce. The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause is an additional barrier to these incentives, as it prevents unreasonable distinctions between citizens of different states. Although the New Mexico Film Incentive Program is not under current attack for either of the aforementioned reasons, there is a possibility that it may not pass constitutional muster if challenged in the future.
This Comment explores the reasons behind runaway production, its economic impact, and the relationship between runaway production and state tax incentives. It also describes the specific offerings of the New Mexico Film Incentive Program and concludes that the program walks a fine constitutional line in regard to the Dormant Commerce Clause but is well within the parameters of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Manning v. Mining and Minerals Division: Sovereign Immunity as a Bar Against Claims for Damages Brought Under the U.S. Constitution
Nat Chakeres
In Manning v. Mining & Minerals Division, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the question of whether state sovereign immunity, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine, blocked a lawsuit against the state for monetary damages based upon violations of the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Takings Clause claims were not barred by sovereign immunity because the U.S. Supreme Court had never suggested that sovereign immunity blocked such claims, the text of the Takings Clause prescribes a monetary remedy, the purpose of the Clause would be frustrated if litigants could not seek monetary damages, and due process requires that the State provide citizens remedies that have been promised to them. In so holding, the New Mexico Supreme Court also suggested that the State had wide latitude in altering the procedures that litigants would have to pursue to collect takings claims. With regard to the Contracts Clause, the court held that Contracts Clause claims for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity under the U.S. Supreme Court case Hans v. Louisiana, which itself had barred a Contracts Clause claim. By blocking the Contracts Clause claim, the court implicitly rejected a broad sovereign immunity exception that would have allowed all claims arising under the Constitution itself. Instead, the sovereign immunity exception appears limited to cases where the litigant was denied a remedy guaranteed by due process or the Constitution.
Multiple Tortfeasors Defined by the Injury: Successive Tortfeasor Liability After Payne v. Hall
Megan P. Duffy
In Payne v. Hall, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed issues of tort liability where multiple tortfeasors injure a plaintiff: How to apportion liability among the various tortfeasors, how and to what extent comparative fault may be presented at trial, and how to properly instruct the jury on multi-tortfeasor issues. In Payne, the New Mexico Supreme Court examined the differences between concurrent and successive tortfeasors and reaffirmed that the presence of divisible injuries is the distinguishing factor between the two theories of liability. In addition, the court approved the continued application of joint and several liability in limited circumstances when successive tortfeasors cause two separate and divisible injuries. This Note examines the development of multi-tortfeasor law in New Mexico leading up to Payne v. Hall in 2006 before analyzing how Payne applies in a variety of multi-tortfeasor actions. In addition, this Note discusses an alternative causation-based approach to multi-tortfeasor actions originally suggested by Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe and Judge Alarid’s special concurrence to the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ decision in Payne. The Article concludes by evaluating the newly adopted Uniform Jury Instructions for successive tortfeasor actions and posits that these instructions may alleviate some of the confusion in multi-tortfeasor cases.
ACLU of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque: Does Current Equal Protection Adequately Protect Some of the Most Hated Members of Our Society?
Jeremy K. Harrison
In response to the threat posed by sex offenders, State and local government’s have enacted sex offender registration and notification laws that require convicted sex offenders to share vast amounts of personal information with local police departments. The City of Albuquerque, in an attempt to rid its streets of convicted sex offenders, passed one of these laws. This Note analyzes the American Civil Liberties Union’s challenge to Albuquerque’s sex offender registration act. The Article begins with a brief history of sex offender legislation in our nation, discusses whether statistical studies of the threat posed by sex offender’s justifies our treatment of these individuals, and then discusses the arguments made by the American Civil Liberties Union and the treatment of those arguments by the New Mexico Court of Appeals. Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting that the current tiered scrutiny equal protection analysis used by the court should be rejected and replaced with a balancing approach that would more adequately consider the interests of individuals and the government.
State v. Romero: The Legacy of Pueblo Land Grants and the Contours of Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Robert L. Lucero, Jr.
The legal status of the New Mexico Pueblos and their land has unique and complex historical trajectories resulting from the interactions of the Pueblos with other sovereigns: Spain, Mexico, the United States, and New Mexico. This layered history has modern relevance to the manner and extent of jurisdiction that federal, state, and tribal governments exercise in New Mexico. In State v. Romero, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the state of New Mexico has no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by Indians within the external boundaries of Pueblo land grants. This Note analyzes Romero by providing a historical background of the Pueblo land grants and jurisdiction in Indian country and then examining the rationale of the New Mexico Supreme Court in light of this historical and legal backdrop. Although the Romero court wisely reaffirmed state and federal recognition of inherent Pueblo sovereignty and correctly determined that the State of New Mexico may not prosecute the defendants at hand, its opinion misapplies the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, creates a troublesome analogy between Pueblos and reservations, and may create unintended ramifications that could impact civil jurisdiction in Pueblo Indian country.
The Right to Consul and the Right to Counsel: A Critical Re-Examining of State v. Martinez-Rodriguez
Marshall J. Ray
In State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not create an individually enforceable right and that a detainee therefore does not have standing to litigate the issue himself. The court reached this conclusion using traditional methods. The court rested its holding on three main bases: First, that the text of Article 36 did not contain rights-creating language that is specific enough to overcome a traditional presumption that treaties do not create individual rights; second, that U.S. Supreme Court precedent provided some support for this position; and third, that the State Department, to which great deference is owed in matters of treaty interpretation, adhered to a similar position. The court also held that the defendant did not suffer any prejudice from the alleged violation, although the court did not explain how or whether prejudice could ever be shown for violations of Article 36. The court’s holding should be reevaluated because Article 36 in fact contains clear rights creating language, and because the legal backdrop against which the ruling emerged has evolved substantially in the direction of undermining it. Moreover, New Mexico courts could examine individual violations of Article 36 to determine whether a detainee suffered prejudice. In some instances, such prejudice might rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Such an approach by ours or any other state’s court would be a step in the direction of helping the United States to comply with its treaty obligations.
